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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.1 In Campbell,
the Supreme Court will decide whether the commercial sale of a
musical parody which pokes fun at a popular song may be re-
stricted by the copyright holder of the original song under the
Copyright Act of 1976.2 In granting certiorari, the Court limited its
consideration to a specific question: "Whether petitioners' com-
mercial parody was a 'fair use' within the meaning of 17 U.S.C.
section 107."s While most courts have recognized that under Sec-
tion 107 certain parodies may not be subject to the restrictions of
the Copyright Act, there is no consensus regarding the standard to
apply in determining whether a parody is exempt.4 Many courts,
including the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose, draw the line at corn-
* B.A., Providence College, 1990; J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1993. This
Comment won first prize in the regional Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored
by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, and is being considered in
the national competition.
1. 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3667 (1993).
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the Act" or "the Copyright Act," 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1976).
3. 61 U.S.L.W. 3667 (1993).
4. "Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, adopted under the express authority of Arti-
cle 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution granting Congress the power to give au-
thors exclusive rights to their writings, protects musical works, including accompanying
words." Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1434 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)). 17 U.S.C. § 107, which
provides for "fair uses," is the section through which most courts have found parodies ex-
empt from copyright restrictions.
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mercial use, prohibiting parodists from creating parodies of copy-
righted material for profit.' As a result, the Court's decision in
Campbell undoubtedly will have a significant impact in the en-
tertainment industry where parodies play a popular role.
How should the competing interests of original artists and
parodists be balanced under copyright law? This question has
plagued courts since the drafters of the Copyright Act failed to ex-
pressly provide an answer.7 Campbell presents the Supreme Court
with the opportunity to either adopt the economic approach fa-
vored by many, reject the economic approach in favor of tradi-
tional fair use standards, or create a whole new standard particular
to parody cases. This Comment addresses the options before the
Court in Campbell by analyzing the role of parody and looking at
standards applied by prior courts and proposed by critics.
Section II provides an overview of parody and copyright law,
beginning with a look at copyright protection in general and the
fair use exception in particular. This section covers the Supreme
Court cases addressing fair use, as well as all recent cases address-
ing parody under Section 107 of the Copyright Act. Section III fo-
cuses on Campbell and the particular issues before the Supreme
Court. Section IV reaches the conclusion that there are two key
issues in parody cases: whether the work is in fact a parody and
whether parodies are entitled to greater freedom than mere com-
mercial copying. Section IV also urges the Supreme Court to recog-
nize that parodies present a number of interests that do not exist
in copying cases and that they should be entitled to the fair use
exemption from copyright protection.
II. BACKGROUND
Campbell comes at a time when confusion and criticism about
the application of the principles of copyright law to parodies are at
a peak." Since the Supreme Court has not addressed parody under
5. The Sixth Circuit made it perfectly clear where they were drew the line: "It is
likely, for example, that an identical use of the copyrighted work in this case at a private
gathering on a not-for-profit basis would be a fair use. It is the blatantly commercial pur-
pose of the derivative work that prevents this parody from being a fair use." Acuff-Rose, 972
F.2d at 1439. (Because different parties petitioned to the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme
Court, the lower court decisions will be referred to as Acuff-Rose, and the Supreme Court
case as Campbell).
6. Parodies play a popular role in many television shows as well as provide a livelihood
for many artists.
7. In fact, no copyright law enacted by Congress has ever directly addressed parodies.
8. Compare Acuff-Rose with Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group,
886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp.
[Vol. 11:105
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the Copyright Act, the Court's previous decisions applying copy-
right principles in other contexts provide limited direction in how
to proceed in a parody case.' As a result, lower courts have had
little desire to recognize and develop the competing interests
unique to parody. Instead, courts have limited their analysis to
traditional factors found in copyright law, focusing particularly on
economic interests. Typically, commercial use has been the decid-
ing factor. The commercial use dichotomy is at the root of the Su-
preme Court's decision to grant certiorari, and it is essential to the
future of parody. By denying a fair use for a rap group who paro-
died a traditional pop music standard solely upon economic rea-
sons, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the commitment many courts
have made to placing the economic rights of copyright holders
above all other competing interests."0
A. The Role of Parody
The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell will greatly affect
the role parody will play in the future. Therefore, before making a
decision, it is important for the Court to consider the role parody
now has in our society and to determine whether that is in fact its
optimal role. Since this is the first time the Court is addressing
parody, it presents a unique opportunity for the Court to establish
a standard for the future.
To understand what parody is, is to understand the problems
the Court will face in deciding parody's place in society. "Parody,
in its purest form, is the art of creating a new literary, musical, or
other artistic work that both mimics and renders ludicrous the
style and thought of the original."' It has been considered an in-
dependent art form since ancient times.'
2
By changing the words of the original artist, the parodist com-
ments humorously and critically on the existing work through imi-
440 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
9. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) and Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) for the two most recent
Supreme Court cases discussing fair use, discussed infra notes 74-108 and accompanying
text.
10. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1429.
11. Id. at 1441 (Nelson, J., dissenting)(citing Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright
Infringement: Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1395 (1984)).
12. For an overview of the history of parody, see Yankewich, Parody and Burlesque in
the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1133-37 (1955).
19931
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tation that exposes the original's flaws.13 An essential element of
parody is the taking of ideas from another work. To be a successful
parody, that taking must be to such an extent that the original can
be recognized in the parody by its audience. Otherwise, the parody
fails. Thus, by definition, parody immediately comes into conflict
with the copyright laws which protect the use of original works.
Addressing this conflict, courts have traditionally classified
parody as "comment" or "criticism." '14 This determination has
been based on the principles of "fair use." '15 The concept of fair use
is codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which creates cer-
tain exceptions to copyright protection. 6 While Section 107 does
not directly address the term "parody," it does state that "the fair
use of a copyrighted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, [and]
comment . . . is not an infringement of copyright."'" Courts have
had little difficulty in concluding that parodies fall under the ru-
bric of "criticism" or "comment" as set forth in Section 107.11 Con-
flict, however, has arisen over exactly how the standards of Section
107 should be applied to parody in order to determine which paro-
dies qualify for a fair use exception. In contrast to areas such as
literary criticism or news reporting that fit neatly within a fair use
analysis as "comment" or "criticism," certain competing interests
arise which are unique to parody.' One area in particular that has
posed a dilemma for courts is the commercial nature of most
parodies.20
13. Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of
Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465 (1992).
14. See discussion of traditional fair use standard infra at notes 38-72 and accompany-
ing text.
15. See Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1434.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
17. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
Section 107 also lists four factors to be considered in the fair use determination:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount of work taken from the original;
(4) the effect on the potential market of the original work.
Id.
18. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development
of the fair use analysis in parody cases.
19. Elliott M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions,
Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 TEMp. L. REV. 154 (1988).
20. Other competing interests that arise in parody are principles of defamation, free
[Vol. 11:105
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While all parodies are in substance "criticism" or "comment,"
most are executed in a commercial context. This stems from the
fact that art possesses an economic value. Simply stated, an artist
must make a living. While this sentiment may be unduly contemp-
tuous of aesthetic and ideological impulses, as one court noted, "al-
most all newspapers, books and magazines are published by com-
mercial enterprises that seek to make a profit."21 The same can
also be said of musical recordings.
Many courts have focused on the negative implications of a
commercial use on the market for the original work.22 The courts
do not address, however, the reality that if parodists are denied the
right to enter commercial markets, the art of parody might die.
Not only are commercial markets a source of income for both the
original and derivative artists, they are also the main access to the
public ear.
Imagine the musical parodist who is not allowed to sell his
song to the record industry. Not only is the parodist shut off from
profits from the sale of the work, but also from the distribution of
the work. Since it is expensive to produce, promote, and distribute
music, removal of the commercial incentive takes away the work as
well. Without distribution, who will hear the parody? Without an
audience, what parodist will write? Moreover, should the commer-
cial motive of the writer have any bearing on whether public bene-
fit is derived from the work?2" These questions present the Su-
preme Court with a difficult decision on how to balance the
interests of original artists under the Copyright Act and the rights
of parodists under the fair use doctrine.
B. The Development of Parody in Copyright Law
In the United States, recognition of the right of artists to pro-
speech and obscenity. In any parody decision, each of these factors must be considered.
However, because the Supreme Court limited the issue to whether a commercial parody is a
fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, these factors will not be considered herein.
It has been suggested that these factors might provide a solution to the dilemma about
commercial parodies outside the Act itself. For a further discussion on this point, see Mel-
ville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
21. Abramson, supra note 19, at 155 (citing Consumer's Union v. General Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984)(holding that use of
copyrighted material for commercial purpose does not by itself defeat fair use)).
22. See Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436-37.
23. Abramson, supra note 19, at 155; Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 185 U.S. 1009 (1967)(commercial motive of
author has no bearing on whether public benefit derived from work).
19931
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tect their works from unpermitted uses dates back to the founda-
tion of the country. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the au-
thority to "promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts
• . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
right to their . . . writings."2 ' Since 1790, the Congress has passed
a succession of statutes designed to establish and protect copy-
rights pursuant to this authority.2 5 While the overriding effect of
these statutory enactments was to establish individual copyrights,
the driving purpose remained the advancement of the public
good.2 Over time, Congress expanded the coverage of these stat-
utes until they included all "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression." '27 By protecting authors'
rights, Congress hoped to ensure that the public benefitted from
the author's creative energy. 8
While the constitutional purpose of copyright protection is the
promotion of the literary, scientific, and musical arts, "[t]he unar-
ticulated assumption is that guaranteeing authors a monopoly in
their work will result in a utilization of their talents for monetary
gain. 12 9 In particular, when an author obtains copyright protection
for a work, the author has a number of exclusive rights, "including
rights of reproduction, distribution, performance, display, and ad-
aptation."3 0 It is important to note that the term "adaptation," as
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Michael A. Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective Scope of the Fair Use
Defense to Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 229, 231 (1988).
26. The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance
in its Report accompanying the revision of the Copyright Act in 1909:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Con-
stitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings
- . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and pro-
gress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for lim-
ited periods the exclusive rights to their writings .... In enacting a copyright
law Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how much will the legisla-
tion stimulate the producer and so benefit the producer and so benefit the pub-
lic; and second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the pub-
lic? The granting of such exclusive rights under the proper terms and conditions,
confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of temporary
monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Seas. 7 (1909).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Musical compositions came within the purview of copy-
right protection in 1831. See Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Musical Parody: Derivative Use or
Fair Use?, 7 Loy. ENT. L.J. 299, 301 (1987).
28. Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 ASCAP Sympo-
SiUM 1 (1984).
29. Nunnenkamp, supra note 27, at 301.
30. Id. at 302 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)).
[Vol. 11:105
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used in the Act, has been interpreted to include derivative works
such as parodies. 1 As such, a holder can look to the Copyright Act
for protection against any parodist who borrows from the original
work in a substantial manner.
32
In the case of musical parodies, it is not difficult to establish a
prima facie case of copyright infringement.3 3 "The prima facie
case in an infringement claim requires a showing by the plaintiff
that she possesses a valid copyright for the original work, and that
an unauthorized copying of the work by the defendant has oc-
curred."34 In order to meet her burden, a copyright holder must
only demonstrate that the alleged infringer had an opportunity to
copy the copyrighted work and that there is a substantial similar-
ity between the two works.35
Traditionally, and with parody cases, the measure of compari-
son that courts employ to determine whether a copyrighted work
has been infringed by a subsequent work is whether the later work
is "substantially similar" to the original.3 What constitutes sub-
stantial similarity is often hard to measure:
[T]he determination of the extent of similarity which will con-
stitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one
which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations. It is
31. Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163, 166
(1981).
32. One limit on copyright protection that deserves mentioning is the idea-expression
dichotomy. "A central tenet of copyright law is that an idea may not be copyrighted, but a
particular expression of that idea is subject to protection." Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free
Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1569 (1984). This principle is set forth in
the Copyright Act: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea .... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 217 (1954)("Copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given
only to the expression of an idea-not the idea itself"). This dichotomy between idea and
expression serves two essential purposes in copyright law; "[fjirst, it prevents copyright law
from restricting the free flow of information necessary in a free society, and thereby avoids a
conflict with first amendment values. Second, it preserves the distinction between patents
and copyrights." Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright
Law, 43 U. MiAMI L. REV. 233, 240-41 (1988).
33. "The derivative nature of parodies [is] self-evident; since the purpose of parody is
to conjure up the original work in the audience's mind the parodist must appropriate a
sufficient amount of the work to achieve recognition by the audience." Nunnencamp, supra
note 27, at 302 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)).
34. Id. at 303.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (no substantial similarity
between works when only copying factual and historical information); Steinberg v. Colombia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
1993]
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clear that slight or trivial similarities are not substantial and are
therefore non-infringing. But it is equally clear that the works
may not be literally identical and yet be found substantially
similar for purposes of copyright infringement. The problem,
then, is one of line drawing. Somewhere between the one ex-
treme of no similarity and the other of complete and literal simi-
larity lies the line marking off the boundaries of 'substantial
similarity.' 7
However, since parodies draw attention to the original works that
they are ridiculing, it is unlikely that any copyright infringement
claim brought against a parodist will fail to meet this primary
burden.
C. Fair Use and Parody
In most cases, since a musical parodist is trying to poke fun at
a particular song, anyone who listens to the parody will recognize
similarities to the original."' Thus, parody cases usually turn on
whether the defendant's use of the original was fair within the
meaning of Section 107.1' A fair use is "a privilege in others than
the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the mo-
nopoly granted to the owner by the copyright."' 0 The principle of
fair use has been in existence almost as long as the principle of
37. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1987)(emphasis in
original).
38. This section sets out the fair use principles applied in all derivative works cases,
and in particular, parody cases. While this is generally the approach that courts take to
determine whether a parody is a copyright infringement, it should be noted that a number
of courts, including the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose, have first addressed the issue of
whether the derivative work really is a "parody." For example, in MCA v. Wilson, 425 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and Walt Disney Pictures Corp. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) the courts found a copyright violation because, while the deriva-
tive works were parodying something, they did not attempt to parody or comment ludi-
crously on the original works themselves. In MCA, the song "Cunninglingus Champion of
Company C" infringed upon the copyright of the song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Com-
pany B," because while it "may have sought to parody life, or more particularly sexual mo-
res and taboos," it did not parody the original song. 425 F. Supp. at 453-54. The Walt
Disney court used the same rationale to find that a display of bestiality was a copyright
infringement. 389 F. Supp. at 1398. In contrast to these cases is Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court found that
the song "I Love Sodom" was a parody of the song "I Love New York," because it "clearly
was an attempt by the writers and cast of SNL [Saturday Night Live] to satirize the way in
which New York City has attempted to improve its somewhat tarnished image through the
use of a slick advertising campaign." Id. at 745.
39. Nunnencamp, supra note 27, at 303.
40. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)(citing
Ball, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
8
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copyright. While copyright originally created an exclusive right to
a work, over time, courts found a number of reasons to limit this
protection:
[A] fundamental conflict in the application of the laws became
evident-these laws which give an artist exclusive control over
the created product could actually contradict rather than serve
the law's chief underlying purpose: to encourage creative en-
deavors and their dissemination throughout society.41
In order to achieve this underlying purpose, limits had to be placed
upon the protection granted to copyright holders.42 Thus, the doc-
trine of fair use was created as an equitable doctrine to protect and
foster creative work that is dependent on other people's copy-
righted material.4" The fair use doctrine permits courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when it would stifle the
very creativity which the law was designed to protect."
After application by courts for many years, the fair use doc-
trine received statutory recognition in Section 107 of the Copyright
Act." Section 107 provides:
Fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by [Section 106], for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copyright."
The codification of the fair use doctrine reflects the fact that the
underlying goal of copyright law is not the protection of individual
property rights, but the promotion of creativity and expression for
all people.'7
Under Section 107, the Copyright Act provides four considera-
tions when determining whether a fair use exists:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
41. Chagares, supra note 25, at 232-33.
42. Id. at 233. It has been accepted by courts that the principle of fair use encom-
passes all first amendment concerns present in copyright law. See New Era Publications
Intern v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989).
43. Note, In Defense of Parody, 17 GOLDEN GAT U. L. REv. 57, 58 (1987).
44. Abramson, supra note 19, at 150 (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Note, supra note 43, at 59.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1993]
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work."8
None of these factors is conclusive and each must be weighed in
any fair use decision.4 The determination of how they should be
balanced is crucial because in many cases the emphasis of one fac-
tor over another could tip the scales." In codifying the doctrine of
fair use, Congress made clear that it in no way intended to depart
from judicially-created principles or to short circuit further judicial
development:
The bill endorses the purposes and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doc-
trine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid techno-
logical change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of
what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations
on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or
enlarge it in any way.5 1
By preserving the judiciary's ability to change its considerations in
different cases, Congress recognized the equitable nature of the
doctrine.
52
Prior to the adoption of Section 107, courts did not always ap-
ply fair use in parody cases. The issue was first addressed in 1958
in Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,5s where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a deci-
sion of the Southern District of California which held that a par-
ody was not entitled to protection under the fair use doctrine. In
Loew's, Jack Benny broadcast a burlesque television version of the
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
49. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 416 (1984). However, the courts
consider each of these in different levels of importance. The principal contention of this
Comment is that the first and fourth factors under Section 107, which focus on the effect
upon the commercial market, have been overemphasized by courts and commentators alike
in the parody context, to the detriment of other considerations.
50. See, e.g., New Era Publications v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5659, 5680; See also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 62 (1975). "
52. See, e.g., Original Appalatian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031,
1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986)(incorporating the element of good faith into the fair use analysis);
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1980) (considering the bad faith conduct of ABC in its decision to refuse to allow its fair use
defense).
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motion picture "Gaslight" entitled "Autolight. ' ' 54 The court deter-
mined that a substantial taking existed and refused to consider the
defense of fair use. 5 In finding a copyright violation, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that parody was not
among the "established" areas of fair use, thus, it should not be
entitled to special treatment.5 6
While the Loew's decision was still pending on appeal, the
Southern District of California again addressed the issue of par-
ody.57 This time, however, the court took a different stance. In Co-
lumbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co.,58 the court held
that parodies could borrow from original copyrighted works to the
extent necessary for an audience to be able to "conjure up" the
original in their minds." Since a television broadcast on NBC
called "From Here To Obscurity" borrowed characters and
storyline from the movie "From Here To Eternity" only as much
as was necessary to parody the original to the audience, the court
determined that a fair use existed. 0 The court acknowledged the
nature and social value of parody and recognized that parodists
have a right to some degree of freedom in their creativity.6 ' In its
decision, the court considered the character of the two works, the
nature and object of the selections made, the purpose of the use,
and the amount of material used. 2
Shortly thereafter, a similar approach was adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.6 In Berlin, the de-
fendants, who were publishers of "Mad" magazine published a col-
lection of songs that parodied the lyrics to several of Irving
Berlin's songs.6 4 After recognizing that Loew's and Columbia Pic-
tures were the only modern decisions that had dealt with the con-
flict between parody and copyright, the Second Circuit followed
54. Note, supra note 45, at 60.
55. 239 F.2d at 537.
56. Id. Loew's, Inc., v. Colombia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 183 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
57. Note, supra note 11, at 1402.
58. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
59. Id. at 350.
60. Id.
61. One commentator believes that this decision is different from Loew's for that rea-
son. He points out that in this case, the Court indicates a number of factors that should be
considered when considering the fair use defense in parody cases. Chagares, supra note 25,
at 238.
62. 137 F. Supp. at 354.
63. 219 F. Supp 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), afl'd, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
64. 219 F. Supp at 912.
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the latter, limiting the protection afforded to copyright holders.65
In doing so, the Berlin court established two factors to consider:
Did the parodist use more of the original work than necessary to
"recall or conjure up" the original; and, did the parody attempt to
fill the demand for the original? 66 Under the circumstances of this
case, the court found that the weight of these factors required a
decision in favor of the parodist.
6 7
Once it was established that parody qualified as a fair use, the
next problem was how to apply fair use principles to parody. Since
the fair use doctrine is equitable in nature, each case involves a
balancing of interests between the parties involved. 8 Prior to the
enactment of the Copyright Act, cases examined different consid-
erations and cited different factors to be weighed in their decisions.
In some areas, the determination of whether a fair use exists is
easy to make. For example, a quotation in a book review or schol-
arly article is traditionally a fair use."' However, in other areas,
such as parody, the determination is not so clear. While the equita-
ble approach of fair use is an appropriate means to balance the
competing interests of original artists and parodists, in the area of
parody, courts have been unable to draw a clear distinction be-
tween what is and what is not a fair use.70 Adding to the complex-
ity, courts have not a consistently explained the doctrine: "Since
the doctrine has developed through case-by-case accretion, a par-
ticular rationale may work well for one set of facts but be insuffi-
cient to explain another set. 1 As a result of this variety of criteria
used by the courts "and their application to the facts of the small
number of published opinions dealing with the issue of copyright
infringement and parody, decisions have been inconsistent and
irreconcilable. ,
72
D. The Supreme Court Cases
To help decide whether a particular parody constitutes a fair
65. Chagares, supra note 25, at 239 (citing Berlin, .329 F.2d at 543-44).
66. 329 F.2d at 545. The "conjure up" test is still an important part of the fair use
test, and has been codified as the third factor listed in Section 107 of the Act. See, e.g., Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
67. In Berlin, there was no music accompanying the lyrics, and further, there was little
similarity between the lyrics of the originals and the parodies. 219 F. Supp at 912.
68. Chagares, supra note 25, at 234.
69. Susan Linehan Faaland, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 163, 168 (1981).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 168-69.
72. Chagares, supra note 25, at 235.
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use, the lower courts have relied heavily upon two recent decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court which interpret the principles of fair
use. While these cases did not deal with the issue of parody, they
still have provided the basis for all recent parody/fair use deci-
sions. They have had particular impact in parody cases because of
their approach to economic and commercial uses.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,73
the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of fair use. Sony was a
copyright infringement action by the holder of copyrights of sev-
eral television programs against a manufacturer of home video tape
recorders (VCRs). 4 Universal, the copyright holder, sought money
damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of VCRs based upon the
claim that use of the machines infringed upon their copyright and
as such, Sony, as the manufacturer, should be held liable as a con-
tributory infringer."
Turning its attention to the copyright issue, the Court imme-
diately addressed the limited nature of copyright protection for in-
dividual copyright holders: "The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the gen-
eral benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. ' 7 6
While the copyright holder obtains "exclusive" rights to use and
authorize the use of his work, this protection does not include all
possible uses of his work.77 One limitation on the rights of a copy-
right holder that the Court recognized was the fair use defense.78
However, because of the nature of the infringement action, the
Court did not have an opportunity to address each of the fair use
factors set out in Section 107.79
The manner in which the Court distinguished between com-
mercial and non-commercial uses established the foundation for
the current dispute regarding the effect of commercial use on fair
use. Finding that home taping was protected under fair use, the
Sony Court noted that videotape recorders are used primarily by
consumers for time-shifting of television programming for more
73. 464 U.S. 416 (1984).
74. Id. at 417.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 429 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
77. Id. at 433-34.
78. Id. at 428. Some authors have applied the analysis in Sony to the field of parody.
See Note, supra note 11, at 1407-12, where the author states that the focus is on the com-
mercial nature of the use and the degree of economic harm to the original creator.
79. The ultimate determination to be made was whether Sony was liable for infringe-
ments by other people, namely, those who purchased VCRs made by Sony. 464 U.S. at 432.
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convenient viewing.80 The Court observed that time-shifting con-
stitutes a non-profit, rather than commercial, use of the recorded
programs, since these recordings are typically erased and not sold
after viewing." Drawing a distinction between this and other types
of uses, the Court noted, "every commercial use of copyrighted ma-
terial is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly priv-
ilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."8
One year later, in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises,3 the Supreme Court applied each of the fair use factors to
a copyright case. In Harper & Row, The Nation magazine had
published copyrighted materials from the autobiography of Gerald
Ford without permission from the publisher, Harper & Row.8 4
Harper & Row had made a deal with another magazine for the sale
of excerpts from the autobiography, but once The Nation pub-
lished certain sections, the other magazine withdrew its bid.88 In
response, Harper & Row brought an action against The Nation for
infringement under the Copyright Act."
The Nation's publishers defended on the ground that their
publication of the material was a fair use. While the district court
rejected this argument, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit agreed that a fair use existed. 7 The appellate court found that
"the purpose of the article was 'news reporting,' the original work
was essentially factual in nature, the 300 words appropriated were
insubstantial in relation to the 2,250-word piece, and the impact on
the market for the original was minimal. '8 The court was also par-
ticularly swayed by the "politically significant" nature of the mate-
rial and the importance of using it to educate the public.89
The Supreme Court agreed that the purpose of copyright law
is to increase the harvest of knowledge rather than impede it. The
Court felt, however, that the Second Circuit gave insufficient defer-
80. Alan Corn, Renaming That Tune, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321, 348 (1992); See
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
81. 464 U.S. at 451.
82. Id.
83. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
84. Id. at 542-43.
85. Id. at 543.
86. 557 F. Supp: 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
87. The district court rejected the fair use argument because, while billed as "hot
news," the article contained no new facts, the magazine had been published for profit, the
article took the heart of a "soon to be published" work, and it caused a deal with Time to be
aborted, thus diminishing the value of The Nation's copyright. 471 U.S. at 544.
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ence to the scheme established by the Copyright Act aimed at fos-
tering such knowledge.90 The Court applied the factors enumerated
in Section 107 and determined that a fair use of the copyrighted
work did not exist.9 1
The first factor the Court considered was the purpose of the
use.9 2 While the trial court had determined that the purpose of the
publication was "news," a factor in favor of a finding of a fair use,
the Supreme Court did not believe this was the issue. Rather, the
issue was "whether a claim of news reporting is a valid fair use
defense to an infringement of copyrightable expression."93 The
Court felt that it could not ignore that The Nation's admitted pur-
pose was to scoop other publications of the copyrighted material.
9 '
Therefore, the purpose of the use was not a factor weighing in
favor of a finding of fair use.
The Court also addressed the commercial nature of the use as
a separate factor in its consideration of the purpose of the use.,
Focusing on the commercial impact of the infringing work, the
Court noted that "[tihe crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the ordinary price." '9
Second, the Court considered the nature of the copyrighted
work. Under this factor, the law recognizes a greater need to dis-
seminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy. 7 In
Harper & Row, while the Court found that the original work, as an
autobiography, was in essence a factual work, the Court deter-
mined that the unauthorized use by The Nation was of quotes and
excerpts concerning subjective descriptions and portraits of public
figures rather than the conveyance of facts."
Next, the Court analyzed the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the original that was used in the infringing work.99 The
90. Id. at 545-46.
91. Id. at 549.
92. Id. at 561.
93. Id. (emphasis in original).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 562.
96. Id. See also Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 13.05[AI[1] 13-71,
n.25.3.
97. 471 U.S. at 563 (citing Gorman, Fact or Fantasy? The Implications for Copyright,
29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 560, 561 (1982)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 564.
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Court explained that under this factor, while the exact amount of
infringing is important, it is more important to consider the quali-
tative nature of the infringement."' The court of appeals had de-
termined that this factor weighed in favor of a fair use due to the
fact that The Nation had only taken fifteen percent of the original
work. 101 The Supreme Court noted that although it was a small
percentage quantitatively, in reality, the parts taken were the heart
and soul of the original.102 "In view of the expressive value of the
excerpts and their key role in the infringing work, we cannot agree
with the Second Circuit" that the magazine took a meager amount
of the original language.'
Finally, the Court addressed the effect of the use upon the po-
tential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Explaining
the tremendous weight accorded this factor, the Court stated that
"[tihis last factor is undoubtedly the single most important ele-
ment of fair use."'1 4 Once a copyright holder establishes the exis-
tence of a causal connection between the infringement and a loss
of revenue, the burden shifts to the infringer to show that the
damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copy-
righted expression. 0 5 In Harper & Row, the trial court found that
there had been an actual effect on the market.' 06 The Nation was
unable to rebut this conclusion and the Supreme Court determined
that this factor compelled a finding against fair use.1
0 7
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court gave some indication to
the lower courts on how the Section 107 fair use factors were to be
applied. However, because these factors were applied specifically to
one case, there is still a great deal of uncertainty over their appli-
cation. Lower courts surely will face difficulty in construing the
factors in factually dissimilar situations. In particular, fair use pre-
cedent is difficult to analogize to parody decisions, which involve a
number of concerns not present in other copyright areas. Although
the Supreme Court has recognized that the overriding concern of
copyright law is the advancement of the arts for all of society, the
100. Id. at 565.
101. Nation Enters. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 723 F.2d 195, 209 (2d Cir.
1984).
102. 471 U.S. at 566.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 567 (citing 3 NIMMxR § 14.02, supra note 37, at 14-7-14-8.1).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 568. The emphasis that the Court placed on this fourth fair use factor,
combined with the analysis of commercial use under the first factor work together to create
what many courts have treated as almost a complete ban on commercial fair uses.
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emphasis in Harper & Row seemed to be on the economic interest
of the copyright holder.
10 8
E. Precedent Within Parody
Applying the principles in these Supreme Court decisions to
cases involving parody and the fair use defense, the lower courts
have continued to apply each of the Section 107 factors. However,
in many of these cases there is conflicting opinion regarding the
impact of commercial use. 09 A number of courts, including the
Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose, have followed the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Harper & Row by declaring a use unfair whenever it in-
volves commercial gain. Other courts, however, have regarded com-
mercial use as only one of a number of factors to be considered in a
fair use decision.110
In Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co.,"' the Second
Circuit addressed the question of whether a parody of the song "I
Love New York," which appeared as a skit on Saturday Night
Live and ended with the singing of "I Love Sodom" to the same
musical score, was a fair use.11 The court, in a brief written opin-
ion, affirmed the opinion of the district court below, noting that
"copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of parody."" s
On this basis, the court concluded that the "I Love Sodom" parody
was a fair use.1 '
108. The emphasis placed on economic interests may be due to the fact that the inter-
ests presented in Harper & Row were limited to the rights of the copyright holder and the
economic interests of the infringer. There was no concern about the other issues present in
parody, such as the nature of the work as "criticism," the creativity of the derivative work,
its own worth, and its importance to society as dissenting commentary. Rather, Harper &
Row presented a direct economic taking of a copyrighted work. In such a situation, a fair use
should not exist, and the most important factor in determining the outcome should be the
economic interests of the parties. Abramson, supra note 19, at 159.
109. The recent emphasis on economic interests in copyright infringement cases is not
limited to parody cases. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(holding a profit-seeking company may not make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted articles published in scientific and technical journals for use by the company's
scientists employed in scientific research).
110. The following discussion concerns several recent decisions which have been de-
cided on the basis of the commercial nature of the derivative work, in particular through the
first and fourth of the fair use factors as set out in Section 107. This is not to discount the
importance of the second and third statutory fair use factors, but to focus on the manner in
which the courts have stressed the commercial nature of parodies. This is precisely the issue
before the Supreme Court in Campbell.
111. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
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The district court, in considering whether the parody was a
fair use, analyzed the four factors set forth in Section 107. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not con-
sider the fact that the parody was part of a commercial television
program.1 5 Rather, the court devoted the majority of its opinion to
determining that the derivative work was indeed a parody and that
the parody had no impact on the original work's market." 6 After
determining that "the defendant's version of the jingle has not in
the least competed with or detracted from plaintiff's work," the
court dismissed the case.
1 7
More recently, in Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
Inc.,"' the District Court for the Southern District of New York
was presented with another opportunity to consider fair use in a
commercial context. Because this case involved an appropriation
for the purpose of promoting the sale of commercial products, the
court found a copyright infringement. 9 In Tin Pan Apple, a rap
music group, the "Fat Boys," brought an action against a beer
brewing company for its production and distribution of a commer-
cial which used sound-alikes and look-alikes of the rap group. The
look-alikes performed in a style distinct to the group in order to
promote the brewer's products. 20 The court determined that be-
cause the lyrics of the derivative work did not attempt to satirize
the "Fat Boys" or their work, but instead copied their image "to
promote the sale of commercial products," it was not even a par-
ody, and therefore did not merit consideration of the Section 107
factors.1 2' Based on a long line of precedent, the court concluded
115. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This may be due to the fact that the Supreme
Court decisions, discussed supra notes 73 to 109 and accompanying text, which declared a
commercial use presumptively unfair, had not yet been decided.
116. 482 F. Supp. at 746-47.
117. Id. at 747.
118. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
119. Id. at 832. See also Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), where the court stated:
In analyzing the commercial or noncommercial nature. . . it is useful to distin-
guish between two conceptually different situations: advertising material that
promotes a parody of a copyrighted work, and advertising material that itself
infringes a copyright. In the first case, the fact that the advertisement uses ele-
ments of the copyrighted work does not necessarily mean that it infringes the
copyright, if the product that it advertises constitutes a fair use of the copy-
righted work.
See also, Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242-44 (2d Cir.
1983)(holding that promotional broadcasts for television series legally parodying the Super-
man comic strip character did not infringe copyright of Superman character).
120. 737 F. Supp. at 828.
121. Id. at 830-32.
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that "there is ample authority for the proposition that appropria-
tion of copyrighted material solely for personal profit, unrelieved
by any creative purpose, cannot constitute parody as a matter of
law.' 122
In Original Appalatian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum,
12 3
the Northern District of Georgia reached the same result, although
within the context of the first element of Section 107, namely, "the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."
12'
Here, the court rejected the parody defense because "the primary
purpose behind [the] defendant's parody [was] not an effort to
make a social comment but [was] an attempt to make money." ' 5
In Topps, the holder of a copyright on "Cabbage Patch Kids"
brought an action for infringement against Topps, the distributor
of "Garbage Pail Kids" stickers and chewing gum cards.126 Analyz-
ing the type of use under the first factor of section 107, the court
determined that:
Neither are the Garbage Pail Kid Stickers merely one of a series
of spoofs of various different products, as defendant has pro-
duced in the past, nor a single cartoon or editorial in a broader
satirical product such as Mad Magazine. The basic concept be-
hind the defendant's sticker is aimed at capitalizing on the Cab-
bage Patch craze. 12
7
Thus, the court concluded that the commercial nature of Topps'
use of the copyrighted material precluded a finding of fair use.
1 28
The Second Circuit recently addressed the defense of fair use
in parody in the context of a commercial use in Rogers v. Koons. 29
In Koons, a photographer brought an infringement suit against a
sculptor who had copied from his copyrighted photograph "Pup-
pies" to create a sculpture known as "String of Puppies."130 As a
defense, Koons, the defendant, raised parody and the privilege of a
122. Id. at 831. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp
741, aff'd 623 F.2d 252; Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964); D.C. Comics
v. Crazy Eddie, 205 U.S.Pat.Q. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
123. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
124. Id. See also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp.
1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(finding that a music video entitled "A Nightmare on My Street" was
not a parody of "A Nightmare on Elm Street").
125. 642 F. Supp. at 1034.
126. Id. at 1032.
127. Id. at 1034.
128. Id.
129. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
130. Id. at 304.
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fair use.'"' The court first determined that "String of Puppies" was
not a satire of the original work, but at best was a parody of mod-
ern society.1"2 Since it did not parody the original, there was no
need to "conjure up" the original at all. Thus, any similarity was
an infringement' 3 3 The Court stated:
By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, we
merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the
parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable
to a different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that
the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in
some manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with
the parody. 34
The Rogers court also addressed the overriding commercial
motive behind Koons' taking, but concluded that "though it is a
significant factor, whether the profit element of the fair use
calculus affects the ultimate determination of whether there is a
fair use depends on the totality of the factors considered; it is not
itself controlling.' 3 5 Nevertheless, after applying the statutory fair
use factors, the court determined that:
there is simply nothing in the record to support a view that
Koons produced 'String of Puppies' for anything other than sale
as high-priced art. Hence, the likelihood of future harm to Rog-
ers' photograph is presumed, and Plaintiff's market for his work
has been prejudiced.'
The court's analysis focused on the effect of the use on the
market for the original. 3 7 As applied, this factor also centers
131. Id. at 309.
132. Id. at 310.
133. Id. See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 185; 3 NIMMER, supra note 37, at §.
13.05[C] n.60.9.
134. 960 F.2d at 310.
135. Id. at 309.
136. Id. at 312. This approach marks a change from the Second Circuit's position in
Elsmere, and is a far cry from its opinion in Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), where the court stated:
whether an author or publisher reaps economic benefits from the sale of a bio-
graphical work, or whether its publication is motivated in part by a desire for
commercial gain, or whether it is designed for the popular market, i.e. the aver-
age citizen rather than the college professor, has no bearing on whether a public
benefit can be derived from such a work.. . . Thus we conclude that whether an
author or publisher has a commercial motive or writes in a popular style is irrel-
evant to a determination of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in a
work which offers some benefit to the public constitutes a fair use.
Id. at 307.
137. 960 F.2d at 312.
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around commercial use. Even though the derivative work did not
impact on the market for the original work itself, the court noted
that it did interfere with the copyright holder's ability to produce
derivative works and adaptations on the original, a right protected
by the copyright laws.
138
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ad-
dressed a similar case in United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v.
Koons."3 9 Once again Koons was in court defending one of his
sculptures against a copyright infringement claim. This time,
United Features Syndicate charged him with infringing upon their
copyrights of the "Garfield" comic strip and, in particular, the
character of "Odie.""10 Koons had created a sculpture titled "Wild
Boy and Puppy," the "Puppy" being based on the character
"Odie" from the Garfield comic strip."" Although Koons admitted
that he did copy the "Odie" caricature, he asserted that the sculp-
ture was privileged under the fair use doctrine as a parody." 2
The district court stayed its decision pending release of the
Second Circuit's decision in the previously discussed case of Rog-
ers.14s After the Rogers court found that Koons' "String of Pup-
pies" piece was an infringement on Rogers' copyright, Koons ar-
gued that the differences in his two sculptures merited a different
outcome in the United Feature Syndicate case."" After weighing
the Section 107 factors, however, the district court concluded that,
like the Rogers case, "Koons' use of the copyrighted 'Odie' charac-
ter was 'of a commercial nature' and that Koons stands to profit
from his exploitation without paying the customary price."'"" Like-
wise, under the fourth factor, the commercial nature of the work
also had a significant impact on the potential market for the origi-
nal." 6 Based on these considerations, the court concluded that a
fair use did not exist.1
47
In Fisher v. Dees,"" the Ninth Circuit took a more liberal ap-
138. Id.
139. 817 F.Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
140. Id. at 372.
141. Id. at 373.
142. Id. at 374.
143. Id at 375.
144. Id. at 376.
145. Id. at 379.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). Compare Fisher with Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)(holding that a parody was not a fair use because it
borrowed more of the original than was necessary for the parodist's purpose).
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proach toward the commercial factors analysis. In Fisher, the com-
posers and owners of the popular 1950s song, "When Sunny Gets
Blue," sued the disc jockey Rick Dees for copyright infringement
when he released a song titled "When Sonny Sniffs Glue. ' 14 9 The
district court granted Dees' motion for summary judgment, dis-
missing the claim based on the fair use defense.
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered both the first and fourth statutory fair use factors. 150 While
recognizing that a commercial use "tends to weigh against a find-
ing of fair use," the court noted that "[t]he defendant can rebut
the presumption by convincing the court that the parody does not
unfairly diminish the economic value of the original."15' The court
recognized that in such a case, while the parody is distributed com-
mercially, it still may be "more in the nature of an editorial or
social commentary than. . . an attempt to capitalize financially on
the plaintiff's original work.' 1 52 Thus, the court's focus was partic-
ularly on the fourth factor.1 53
Initially, the Fisher court noted that "[iln assessing the eco-
nomic effect of the parody, the parody's critical impact must be
excluded. Through its critical function, a 'parody may legitimately
aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as
artistically.' "154 By this, the court meant that "the economic effect
of a parody with which we are concerned is not its potential to
destroy or diminish the market for the original-any bad review
can have that effect-but rather whether it fulfills the demand for
the original.'
' 55
After listening to the two songs, the court concluded that
"consumers desirous of hearing a romantic and nostalgic ballad
such as the composers' song would [not] be satisfied to purchase
the parody instead. Nor are those fond of parody likely to consider
'When Sunny Gets Blue' a source of satisfaction.' 1 5 Since the two
149. 794 F.2d at 434.
150. Id. at 437.
151. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
152. Id. at 437 (citing Pilsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.Pat.Q. 124, 131
(N.D. Ga. 1981)).
153. See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)(placing the burden of proving the fourth fair use factor, the effect on the market
for the original, on the plaintiff asserting a copyright violation).
154. 794 F.2d at 437 (quoting B.Kaplan, AN UNHERALDED VIw OF COPYRIGHT 69
(1967))(emphasis added).
155. Id. at 431 (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit similarly endorsed this prin-
ciple in New Era Publications v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990).
156. 794 F.2d at 438.
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songs did not fulfill the same demand, there was no economic ef-
fect on the original's market and the infringement claim could not
stand.
15
In Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.,158 the
Northern District of Illinois followed the Fisher court and recog-
nized the fair use defense in the context of a commercial appropri-
ation. In this case, Eveready sued Coors to enjoin distribution of a




Eveready had been running an ad campaign featuring the "Ener-
gizer Bunny" which depicted a mechanical bunny that continues to
beat on a toy drum while other toys using different batteries grad-
ually stop running. The voice-over states: "Nothing outlasts the
Energizer. They keep going and going and going .. ."160 This pro-
vided the basis for several commercials within commercials in
which the spot would begin with what appeared to be a typical
television advertisement, until a drum beat was heard, distracting
the actors in the commercial, and the Energizer Bunny would
emerge with the voice-over: "Still going. Nothing outlasts the En-
ergizer, they keep going and going and going. .... ,1.
To parody the Energizer ads, Coors created a series of com-
mercials in which Leslie Nielsen, a well-known actor, dressed in a
dark business suit with fake rabbit ears, a fuzzy white tail, and
rabbit feet carries a drum across what appears to be a commercial
for another unidentified beer. 6 ' Eveready sought to enjoin this
commercial's distribution before it aired during the spring of
1991.168
In support of its claim, Eveready relied upon the Tin Pan Ap-
ple case and its assertion that "appropriation of copyrighted mate-
rial solely for personal profit, unrelieved by any creative purpose,
cannot constitute parody as a matter of law."'" Rejecting the Tin
Pan Apple court's position, the Eveready court noted:
It is not apparent to this court what Judge Haight meant by the
157. Id. at 440. Compare Fisher with New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(holding that a parody promoting a product in
direct competition with a derivative product produced by the owners of a copyrighted work
cannot be a fair use).
158. 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
159. Id. at 444.
160. Id. at 442.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 443.
163. Id. at 444.
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phrase 'solely for personal profit.' To the extent that this phrase
may be equated to the phrase 'of a commercial nature,' the
quoted proposition in Tin Pan Apple is directly contrary to §.
107 of the Copyright Act which expressly states that 'the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use 'is of a
commercial nature' is merely one of four factors to consider in
the statutory fair use analysis. 65
While the primary purpose of most television commercials is to in-
crease product sales and thereby increase income, the court stated
that "it is not readily apparent that [commercials] are therefore
devoid of any artistic merit or entertainment value." '166
The court proceeded to apply the statutory factors, and con-
cluded that a fair use did exist. 6 7 Although the first factor, the
commercial nature of the use, weighed in favor of Eveready, the
court declared the remaining three factors were in Coors' favor.'
Looking at the economic effect of the parody on the original, the
court followed the Ninth Circuit in Fisher and excluded any con-
sideration of the critical impact of the parody on the original and
its market. 6 9 Since there was no indication that the "Coors com-
mercial will supplant the market for the Eveready commercial,"
the fourth factor favored Coors.170 Thus, the court was able to find
no infringement.
The aforementioned case law indicates the different ap-
proaches the federal courts have taken to address the impact of
commercial exploitation on fair use. There is no consensus on the
manner in which to treat commercial parodies. Likewise, each deci-
sion is fact specific and difficult to apply to a different set of facts.
Nevertheless, there are several recurring themes which run
throughout the cases. A number of courts, particularly the Second
Circuit, have adopted a presumption that commercial exploitation
is not a fair use of the original work.
III. THE CASE OF CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE Music, INC.
The Sixth Circuit decision in Acuff -Rose symbolizes the exten-
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
166. The Eveready court concluded its analysis of Tin Pan Apple by stating that "to
the extent that the Tin Pan Apple case is intended to establish a standard different from
that established by Congress in § 107(1) of the Copyright Act, this court declines to follow
the former." Id. at 447.
167. Id. at 448.
168. Id. at 447.
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sion of the rights of a copyright holder to a new level.' The Acuff-
Rose court, while going through the traditional fair use litany,
based its opinion solely upon the commercial nature of the deriva-
tive work.1"2 By denying the fair use defense to a rap group that
poked fun at a traditional pop music standard, the Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed the importance of economic interests in copyright law




In 1990, Acuff-Rose Music, the holders of a copyright of the
song "Oh, Pretty Woman" brought suit in U.S. District Court
against a rap group and its individual members for copyright in-
fringement.7 4 The rap group, 2 Live Crew,' 5 had released a ver-
sion of "Oh, Pretty Woman," titled "Pretty Woman," on their al-
bum "As Clean As They Wanna Be." Acuff-Rose claimed "that the
lyrics of 'Oh, Pretty Woman' as sung by 2 Live Crew '[were] not
consistent with good taste or would disparage the future value of
the copyright.' ",176 Further, "Acuff-Rose charge[d] that 2 Live
Crew's music [was] substantially similar in melody to 'Oh, Pretty
Woman' and the lyrics of the first verse are substantially similar to
that of the original version.' 177 In response to the charge of copy-
right infringement, 2 Live Crew moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that their song "Pretty Woman" was a parody that
constituted a fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
7 8
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found
a fair use and granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
171. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
172. "It is the blatantly commercial purpose of the derivative work that prevents this
parody from being a fair use." Id. at 1439.
173. Id.
174. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). The
song was co-authored by Roy Orbison and William Dees, who assigned their rights in the
music to Acuff-Rose Music. Acuff-Rose copyrighted the song in 1964, and has continued to
generate profits from it ever since. Id. at 1152. The action also involved state law charges of
interference with business relations and interference with prospective business advantage,
but these charges were resolved at the district court level, where the court determined that
these charges were preempted by the Copyright Act. Id. at 1160.
175. For simplicity's sake, where "2 Live Crew" is referred to throughout this Com-
ment, it incorporates by reference the individual members of the group as well as each of
the defendants in the case.
176. Id. at 1152.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1154.
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ants.179 As the basis for its decision, the district court focused on
the four factors of Section 107 and relied on existing case law on
parodies and fair use. In particular, the court relied on the case of
Fisher v. Dees,5 0 which the court viewed as analogous in many re-
spects."'s Like the Ninth Circuit in Fisher, the district court deter-
mined that a commercial use of a musical parody did not preclude
a finding of fair use. 182
The district court began its analysis by determining that
under the first prong of Section 107, the purpose and character of
the use was to create a parody of the original work.' After decid-
ing that "the facts convincingly demonstrate that it is a parody,"
the court concluded that the fact that it was distributed commer-
cially did not outweigh the social benefits of parody "both as en-
tertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism.' ' 8 4 In its
analysis, the court stated that "[a]lthough 2 Live Crew's primary
goal in releasing 'As Clean As They Wanna Be' is to sell its music,
that finding 'does not necessarily negate a fair use determina-
tion.' """ The court noted that the Supreme Court in Harper &
Row stated that a commercial purpose merely "tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use."'86 Rather, "the crux of the profit/
nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploita-
tion of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.''18 7 Since the court believed that the parody was a valid com-
179. Id. at 1158-59. "Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact." Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). "Where the district court has found
facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate court 'need not remand
for further factfinding . . . [but] may conclude as a matter of law that [the challenged use
does] not qualify as a fair use of the copyright work.'" Id.
180. 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
181. 754 F. Supp. at 1154-58.
182. Id. at 1154. The court analyzed each of the four statutory factors. Because of this
nature of this Comment, only the first and fourth are discussed. After briefly noting that the
original work was a creative rather than factual work, the court found that the second fac-
tor, the nature of the copyrighted work, weighed in favor of Acuff-Rose. Id. at 1155-56.
Regarding the third factor, the court determined that since "[i]t is a settled aspect of copy-
right law that parodists have the right to conjure up the object of the parody," the amount
of the original borrowed was not viewed as excessive. Id. at 1156.
183. Id. at 1154.
184. Id. at 1154-55 (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
185. Id. at 1154 (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 13.05[A] at 13-70).
186. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985)). This interpretation is much less restrictive than the view other courts have taken.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d. Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has held
that copies made for commercial or profit-making purposes are presumptively unfair.").
187. 754 F. Supp. at 1154 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
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mentary rather than just a commercial endeavor, it found the first
factor of Section 107 favored 2 Live Crew.
188
Similarly, when analyzing the fourth factor, the impact on the
market for the original, the court decided in favor of the defend-
ants. The court stated that, "[als in Fisher, it is extremely unlikely
that 2 Live Crew's song could adversely affect the market for the
original. The intended audience for the two songs is entirely differ-
ent. The odds of a record collector seeking the original composition
who would purchase the 2 Live Crew version are remote."'1 89 Since
the two markets were disparate, there was no economic impact on
Acuff-Rose's market. Moreover, following the court in Fisher, the
district court refused to consider the parody's critical impact on
the original in assessing its affect on the market.1 90
The court also addressed Acuff-Rose's argument that the re-
lease of the parody interfered with its right under the fourth prong
of section 107 not only to the market for the original, but also to
the market for derivative works.1 91 To this argument, the court re-
sponded that, "[iun a world where copyright monopoly stretched to
that great extent, parodies would be unlikely ever to be approved
by the original author.1192 The court was unwilling to extend copy-
right protection to Acuff-Rose if it meant the complete exclusion of
parodies. 193 Because it found that 2 Live Crew created a parody of
"Oh, Pretty Woman" that, while commercial in nature, did not in-
terfere with the market for the original, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of 2 Live Crew and dismissed Acuff-
Rose's copyright infringement claim.1
9 4
B.. The Sixth Circuit Decision
In contrast to the district court, the Sixth Circuit had a diffi-
cult time believing that the song "Pretty Woman" by 2 Live Crew
was even a parody of the original work.1 95 The court questioned at
great length the district court's conclusion that the song was a par-
188. Id. at 1155.
189. Id. at 1158.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 13.05[C], 13-90.12; Fisher, 794 F.2d at
437 ("Parodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied. . . . The
parody defense to copyright exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be
bought.").
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1160.
195. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1435 n.8 (6th Cir. 1992).
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ody, noting that "even accepting that 'Pretty Woman' is a com-
ment on the banality of white-centered popular music, we cannot
discern any parody of the original song." 196 The Sixth Circuit de-
fined the essential elements of parody: "[Flailing a direct comment
on the original, there can be no parody, as the 'copied work must
be, at least in part an object of the parody, otherwise there would
be no need to conjure up the original work.' ",197
After concluding that the district court might have erred in
deciding that "Pretty Woman" was indeed a parody, the Sixth Cir-
cuit nonetheless accepted the district court's conclusion and pro-
ceeded to apply the statutory fair use factors. 198 Throughout the
opinion, however, it is apparent that the court's reluctance in ac-
cepting the song as a parody influenced its determination of the
fair use factors, swaying the court to find for the plaintiff.
This influence on the court is particularly evident in its analy-
sis of the second statutory factor, the portion of the original work
used. The district court found that this factor weighed in favor of 2
Live Crew because a certain degree of the original was necessary to
make the parody effective.1 99 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit, after
noting that the district court made its analysis based on the pre-
sumption that the song was a parody, only examined the substan-
tial degree of taking involved. 00 The court stated that "[n]ear ver-
batim taking of the music and meter of a copyrighted work
without the creation of a parody is excessive taking," and con-
cluded that the degree of taking in this case could not support a
finding of fair use. 20 1 Thus, while purporting to accept the district
court's finding that the purpose of the song was to parody the orig-
inal, the Sixth Circuit's language and its ultimate decision did not
reflect this.
When applying the first fair use factor, the purpose of the use,
the court regarded the commercial 'nature of the use of primary
importance. The Sixth Circuit determined that the district court
did not place enough emphasis on the commercial aspects of the
work:
We agree that a commercial purpose is not itself controlling on
the issue of fair use, but find that the district court placed insuf-
196. Id. at 1436 n.8.
197. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992)).
198. Id. at 1435.
199. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
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ficient emphasis on the command of Harper & Row, wherein the
Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed its earlier holding that
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly power that belongs to
the owner of the copyright.
20 2
Beginning with the presumption that a commercial work was un-
fair, the court concluded that the defendants could not meet this
burden because they could not show that "the parody does not un-
fairly diminish the economic value of the original. ' 20 3 Since the
Sixth Circuit considered the commercial nature of the work of
equal importance as the purpose of the work itself, the court found
that the first factor weighed in favor of Acuff-Rose.204
Similarly, when addressing the fourth fair use factor, the court
found in favor of Acuff-Rose. 20 5 The court reached this conclusion
based upon the same principle employed under the first factor, the
economic impact on the market for the original.20 The court
stated that the plaintiff did not have to demonstrate an existing
harm to the original, but only "that some meaningful likelihood of
future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that
likelihood may be presumed. ' 207 Further, the court found that "the
use of the copyrighted work is wholly commercial, so that we pre-
sume that a likelihood of future harm to Acuff-Rose exists. 202 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that "the record on this factor [did]
not support a finding of fair use."209
In its analysis under both the first and fourth factors, the
court was most concerned with the commercial nature of the par-
ody. The court noted that "in dealing with uses popularly termed
parodies, the factors involving the commercial nature of the use
202. Id. at 1437 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
203. Id. at 1437 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). This consideration
is generally the fourth fair use factor, but in this case, the court uses the same rationale to
find in favor of Acuff-Rose on the first fair use factor as it does for the fourth. However,
when analyzing it under the first factor, the court does not state exactly how the parody
infringes on the original's market.
204. Id. ("[Tihe admittedly commercial nature of the derivative work-the purpose of
the work being no less important than its character in the Act's formulation-requires the
conclusion that the first factor weighs against a finding of fair use.")(emphasis in origi-
nal)(citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984)).
205. Id. at 1439.
206. Id. at 1438.
207. Id. (emphasis in original).
208. Id. (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (addressing the ques-
tion of commercial copying after concluding that a parody did not exist).
209. Id. at 1439.
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and the damage to the defendant are of particular significance."210
Because the song was released and distributed commercially, the
court refused to find a fair use. By its language, the court made it
apparent that, but for this commercial use, a fair use would have
existed: "[I]t is likely, for example, that an identical use of the
copyrighted work in this case at a private gathering on a not-for-
profit basis would be a fair use. It is the blatantly commercial pur-
pose of the derivative work that prevents this parody from being a
fair use."2"
C. The Dissent
In Acuff-Rose the Sixth Circuit applied the fair use standards
in the case of a parody in the same manner it would have in any
other commercial infringement case. As previously noted, this
stems from the court's underlying doubt about the nature of the 2
Live Crew song as a parody in the first place. On the other hand,
Judge Nelson, dissenting, recognized that "the statutory factors
are likely to have a somewhat different impact on our deliberations
than they would in a non-parody situation. 'z12 In Judge Nelson's
view, "the 2 Live Crew song is a quintessential parody.12 1 While
claiming no "illusions of musical expertise," he found that after
listening to the two songs, "the 2 Live Crew version both imitates
and distorts the original work for comic and satiric effect, and does
so in such a way that both the original work and the work of the
parodist are readily recognizable."21
The different view Judge Nelson had toward the 2 Live Crew
song is reflected in the contrast between his analysis of the fair use
factors and that of the majority. 1 5 Considering the first fair use
factor, he addressed the issue underlying the court's decision:
"Does the mere fact that the parodist hoped to make money mean
that their use is presumptively unfair?12 1 Judge Nelson concluded
that it would not.21 7 He noted that the two Supreme Court fair use
cases, Sony and Harper & Row, each "involved mechanical copy-
ing, literally or figuratively, without alteration of the copied mate-
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1440 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1442.
215. Recognizing their importance in this case, Judge Nelson only addressed the first
and fourth fair use factors. Id. at 1445.
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rial. ' ' 218 Judge Nelson sought to draw a distinction between copy-
ing cases and parody cases:
There is a difference, obviously, between copying and carica-
turizing. By calling into being a new and transformed work, the
caricaturist exercises a type of creativity that is foreign to the
work of the copyist. And the creative work of the caricaturist is
surely more valuable than the reproductive work of the copyist.
Since Acuff-Rose involved a parody, Judge Nelson determined that
there should not be a presumption of unfair use; rather, a pre-
sumption should be limited to straightforeward cases of commer-
cial copying.2 9
The dissent also addressed the court's concern regarding the
protection of the author's right to produce derivative works, as set
out in their analysis of the fourth statutory factor.2 " Judge Nelson
once again proposed that parody be treated differently from other
types of fair uses which involve copying only: "Parody again is dif-
ferent. It transforms as it copies, and it may well savage the origi-
nal work in the process. '221 Judge Nelson was concerned that be-
cause artists are unwilling to see their works attacked, they will be
unwilling to license parodies, resulting in their elimination.2 22 Con-
sequently, he expressed concern about putting such a license in the
hands of original artists: "I am still uneasy, however, about the
prospect of the courts turning copyright holders into censors of
parody. Neither the history of the fair use doctrine nor the four
factors enumerated in the Copyright Act compel such a result. '122
In conclusion, Judge Nelson proposed an additional factor
which he believed that, although not enumerated in the Copyright
Act, merited consideration in the determination of when parody
constitutes fair use: the social value of the parody as criticism.2 24
In his view, the most significant message in the 2 Live Crew Song
was its vulgarity and "[w]hether we agree or disagree [with the 2
Live Crew message], this perception is not one we ought to
suppress.
' 15
218. Id.; See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); See
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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IV. CAMPBELL BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Based on the case law set out above, as well as the approach
set forth by the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
and the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose, there are two important ques-
tions in every parody fair use case. The first is simply whether or
not the derivative work is a parody. The second is how to apply the
fair use factors to parody. As seen in the differences between the
district court and the Sixth Circuit decisions, the answer to the
first has a significant impact on the outcome of the second. If the
Supreme Court determines that the song "Pretty Woman" by 2
Live Crew is a parody, the Court must then decide whether a par-
ody is entitled to more protection as a fair use than mere commer-
cial copying. The answer to this question will be reflected in the
manner in which the Court applies the fair use factors.
A. Is it Parody?
The threshold question presented in Campbell is whether the
song "Pretty Woman" by 2 Live Crew is a parody as defined by the
courts. To find a parody, in the context of fair use, a song must
create a new musical work that both mimics and renders ludicrous
the style and thought of the original.226 The district court and the
Sixth Circuit grappled with this issue, ultimately reaching different
conclusions.227 On its face, the issue framed by the Supreme Court
seems to resolve this dispute: "Whether petitioners' commercial
parody was a 'fair use' within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. section
107.''228 However, as part of its analysis, the Court should not over-
look the importance of the definition of parody.
The question of whether a song is a parody is paramount, be-
cause the term parody indicates not only that the song ridicules
another, but also that an independent creative and critical force
exists in the song. A number of courts have used the question of
whether a derivative work is a parody as a preliminary test before
considering the fair use factors. 229 For example, in Tin Pan Apple,
the court, after concluding that the derivative work was not a par-
ody, did not even apply the fair use factors, but concluded that a
226. 972 F.2d at 1441 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
227. While the Sixth Circuit purports to accept the district court's conclusion that the
song is a parody, the court expressed its reservations in a page long footnote, and as argued
above, in the end this reservation impacted on the outcome of the case.
228. 61 U.S.L.W. 3667 (1993)(emphasis added).
229. See MCA v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Walt Disney Pictures
Corp. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), supra note 40.
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fair use did not exist.2So Other courts have taken a different ap-
proach and subsumed the question of whether a derivative use is a
parody into the analysis of the first fair use factor.3 1
By assuming 2 Live Crew's song is a parody in granting certio-
rari, is the Court recognizing that the song is a "criticism" of an-
other work, or is the Court using the term "parody" in its popular
meaning?" 2 If it chooses the latter, will the Court address the issue
within the fair use analysis? Whichever analysis it chooses, the line
between parodies and other uses must be drawn.
This Comment proposes that the Court adopt the parody
question as a preliminary test, as the Tin Pan Apple court did.233
When courts simply apply the fair use factors to derivative works
which might be parodies and address the question of whether the
work is a parody within the fair use analysis, the issues become
convoluted.23 4 Rather, by establishing the parody test prior to the
fair use analysis, the Court can recognize the interests inherent in
parody that are not present in mechanical copying cases. Then,
once the Court has determined that a parody exists, and that there
is an underlying "criticism," the Court can apply the fair use fac-
tors in its chosen manner.
B. Is There A Distinction Between Parody and Copying?
Once the Court determines that a parody exists, as the district
court did, the question before it becomes as Judge Nelson argued
in his dissent in Acuff-Rose, whether there is a distinction between
parodies and cases of simple copying. In determining whether com-
mercial parodies qualify as fair use under Section 107, the Court
has a clear choice. It may rely on its precedent established in Sony
and Harper & Row, extending them to hold all commercial uses
presumptively unfair.23 On the other hand, the Court may declare
230. 737 F. Supp. 826, 830-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Elsmere Music v. National
Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
231. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); New Line Cinema Corp. v.
Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Original Appalatian Artworks
v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
232. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Acuff-Rose, "the terminology of the fair use analysis
has evolved in such a way that the popular definition of what is a parody and the statutory
definition of parody as a form of criticism have become somewhat confused." 972 F.2d at
1435.
233. 482 F. Supp. at 830-832.
234. For example, in Koons, the fair use analysis would have been much simpler if the
question of whether the infringing art was a parody was addressed first. 960 F.2d at 310.
235. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Harper & Row,
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commercial parodies an exception to copyright protection under
Section 107.236 If the Court opts for the latter, this would not free
all parodies from regulation; it would simply remove the presump-
tion of an unfair use that the courts have applied whenever a com-
mercial use is involved.
The danger from restricting parodies is great. As suggested
earlier in this Comment, the choice to exclude commercial parodies
from the fair use exception will have a detrimental effect on the
production and dissemination of parodies.2 7 The commercial na-
ture of a parody cannot be severed from its other aspects. By tak-
ing away the motivation to produce a work, a court which limits
commercial use essentially limits parody.
The alternative to barring all commercial parodies is to re-
verse the presumption of unfairness that accompanies a commer-
cial use in parody cases. Judge Nelson in his dissent in Acuff-Rose
took this kind of approach. He distinguished Sony and Harper &
Row, the mechanical copying cases, from parody cases. The basis
for this distinction is what he calls "the social value of the parody
as criticism.
'23 8
This justification provides sufficient ground to overturn the
presumption of unfair use in commercial parody cases. The idea of
"the social value of parody as criticism" brings to mind the original
goal of copyright law, as set forth in the Constitution: "[T]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries. ' 239 The goal is the promotion of arts
and sciences. The chosen means is the body of law that is known as
copyright law. This body of law exists for a good greater than just
the protection of individual artist's interests. Copyright law is a
means to an end rather than the end itself.2 40 Thus, this Comment
urges the Court to consider not only the economic rights bestowed
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
236. By choosing this option, the Court would resolve the issue of commercial paro-
dies, but increase a tension that already exists in the parody cases; the courts interpreta-
tions of what is a parody. Rather than attacking the parody as a commercial use, the copy-
right holders would then argue that it was not a parody at all. As the difference of opinion
between the district court and the Sixth Circuit over the conclusion of this issue in Acuff-
Rose indicates, it is not a settled area of the law. 972 F.2d at 1436; 754 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
237. See infra notes 11 to 20 and accompanying text.
238. 972 F.2d at 1446.
239. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
240. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe economic philosophy behind the copy-
right clause ...is the conviction that the encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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by copyright law, but also the underlying motivation for copyright
law itself.
C. Parody as Fair Use
This approach is a valid alternative to a presumption of unfair
use whenever a parody is commercial in nature. Fair use emerged
as an exception to copyright protection for cases when the copy-
right holder's monopoly defeated rather than encouraged the goals
of copyright law. It is an equitable doctrine that calls for a balanc-
ing of all the factors involved in the use. In parody, the question
boils down to this: Which will greater benefit society, the protec-
tion of the economic rights of copyright holders, or freedom for the
parodist to criticize others?
Once the presumption of unfair use is withdrawn from the
question of fair use for commercial parodies, the entire analysis
changes. Parody is now distinguished from simple copying. It is no
longer simply a commercial appropriation, but truly a fair use
within a commercial context.
The approach the Supreme Court took toward commercial
copying in Sony and Harper & Row and the different approaches
other courts have taken toward parody exemplifies this distinction.
This Comment suggests that the Court view the district court
opinion in Acuff-Rose as the appropriate fair use analysis required
in a parody case while the Sixth Circuit opinion provides the suita-
ble approach for a mechanical copying case.
As previously noted, when the Supreme Court addresses the
Campbell case, the decision will be made based on the presump-
tion that the 2 Live Crew song "Pretty Woman" is a parody. That
is the key difference between the district court and Sixth Circuit
opinions. Since the district court held Pretty Woman to be a par-
ody, it thought the song was justified under fair use. 41 The Sixth
Circuit, in contrast, questioned this determination of "parody" and
found in favor of the copyright holder.242 Since the Supreme Court
in granting certiorari has assumed that the song "Pretty Woman"
is a parody, if the Court recognizes the distinction between com-
mercial copying and commercial parodies, it can apply the fair use
factors in a manner similar to the district court. On the other
hand, if the Court decides to limit the freedom of parodists by
presuming an unfair use in commercial parody cases, the Court's
241. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
242. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436.
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decision likely will resemble that of the Sixth Circuit.
In an unauthorized copying case, the commercial nature of the
derivative work is most important. By copying, the infringer takes
advantage of the limited market for the original maintained by the
copyright law and its incentive toward individual creativity. The
Supreme Court recognized this in Sony and Harper & Row.2" In
Harper & Row, the Court concluded that a commercial taking was
unfair in the context of blatant commercial copying.244 Lower
courts have agreed, but also have recognized that parodies are enti-
tled to a certain degree of deference based on their nature as criti-
cism.21 5 In Acuff-Rose, however, because the Sixth Circuit disre-
garded the unique factors presented in parody, the court set a
standard that potentially could stifle all future parody which
emerges in a commercial context. 46
The Supreme Court should reject this standard in favor of a
more flexible approach that protects and encourages the creativity
of the parodist as well as the original artist. By bestowing freedom
on the parodist, the Court will also recognize the social value of the
parody as criticism and comment. While commercial use should re-
main a significant factor in the fair use analysis, it simply should
not be the only consideration in parody cases. The existence of
competing interests important to society demands otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
There are two important questions which arise when a defend-
ant in a copyright infringement case involving a commercial appro-
priation asserts the parody fair use defense. The first is whether
the work is in fact a parody by making a comment on the original.
The second, which the Supreme Court will address, is whether the
work, if a parody, is entitled to a fair use exception from copyright
protection. In Acuff-Rose, the Court must decide whether deriva-
tive works that do more than just copy originals, derivative works
that actually provide a benefit to society, are entitled to a higher
degree of freedom than mere commercial appropriations.
Because parody presents elements not present in simple copy-
ing cases, the Court ought to apply a different standard. Harper &
Row represented a direct economic taking. In such a situation, a
243. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, (1984); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
244. 471 U.S. at 568.
245. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
246. Acufl-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436.
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fair use should not exist and the most important factor in deter-
mining the outcome should be the economic interests of the par-
ties. However, in parody cases, the Court must recognize the au-
thor's creativity and its importance to society as "criticism."
Holding otherwise allows the means by which copyright law exists
to overcome its end.
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